

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	
)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	Civil Action
v.)	No. 99-CV-02496 (GK)
)	
PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED, et al.)	Next scheduled court appearance:
)	July 15, 2004
Defendants.)	
_____)	REDACTED FOR
)	PUBLIC FILING¹

¹Information designated by Defendants as "Confidential" pursuant to Order #7 and Order #36 in the above-captioned action has been redacted. Order #7 allows each Defendant to designate as "Confidential" such information, document or material that it in good faith believes "derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure and use; and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy;" or information otherwise entitled to protection under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Order #36 allows each Defendant to designate as "Confidential" information that is entitled to protection pursuant to Order #7 and meets the further requirement that it is "so proprietary or competitively sensitive that its disclosure to a competitor would cause irreparable competitive injury."

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