UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	**Civil Action No. 99-2496 (GK)**
and	:	
	:	
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS ACTION FUND,	:	
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY,	:	
AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION,	:	
AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION,	:	
AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS,	:	
and NATIONAL AFRICAN AMERICAN	:	
TOBACCO PREVENTION NETWORK,	:	
	:	
Intervenors,	:	
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC.,	:	
(f/k/a Philip Morris, Inc.), *et al.*,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

FINAL OPINION

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